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CASE NOTES
CITIZENSHIP-JUDICIAL REvIEW-ONE DEPRIVED OF CITIZENSHIP
UNDER IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT MAY SEEK INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACT.
Rusk v. Cort (U.S. 1962).
Appellee, who was born in Massachusetts, after registering for the
draft, went to England where he repeatedly ignored several notifications to
report for a physical examination. His draft board then ordered him to re-
port for induction, and his failure to do so resulted in an indictment for
draft evasion.1 That same year, 1954, he left England and went to Czecho-
slovakia. After arriving in the latter country he applied for a United
States passport which was denied on the ground that his citizenship was
lost under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.2 The State
Department Board of Review affirmed this decision. Cort., the appellee,
then instituted this action in a district court seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief under both the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act. Section 349(a)(10) of the Immigration Act
provides for loss of citizenship, whether the person be a national by
birth or by naturalization, when one departs from or remains outside the
jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or national emergency
for the purpose of avoiding the draft.3 The appellant, Secretary of State,
moved to dismiss on the ground that subsections 360 (b) and (c) of the
Immigration Act provide the exclusive remedies under which the agency
determination could be made.4 The above sections concern those who at
1. U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 1954.
2. 66 Stat. 163, 267-268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (10) (1958).
3. Ibid.
4. 66 Stat. 163, 273-274 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (b) and (c) (1958)
"(b) If any person who is not within the United States claims a right or
privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege
by any department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground
that he is not a national of the United States, such person may make application to
a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in the foreign country in which
he is residing for a certificate of identity for the purpose of traveling to a port of
entry in the United States and applying for admission. Upon proof to the satis-
faction of such diplomatic or consular officer that such application is made in good
faith and has a substantial basis, he shall issue to such person a certificate of identity.
From any denial of an application for such certificate the applicant shall be entitled
to an appeal to the Secretary of State who, if he approves the denial, shall state
in writing his reasons for his decision. . . . The provisions of this subsection shall
be applicable only to a person who at some time prior to his application for the
certificate of identity has been physically present in the United States ....
"(c) A person who has been issued a certificate of identity under the provisions
of subsection (b) and while in the possession thereof, may apply for admission to
(683)
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one time have been physically present in the United States, but are not
now within the country and those whose claim of citizenship has been
denied by some agency. The remedy is the filing of an application for a
certificate of identity; if that is denied, one may still appeal to the Secretary
of State.5 If it is issued, however, one may apply for admission to the
United States, subject to regulations relating to aliens. A determination
that he is not entitled to admission is "subject to review in habeas corpus
proceedings and not otherwise." (Emphasis added). The Declaratory Judg-
ment Act provides generally for relief in any controversy within a federal
court's jurisdiction (except in the case of federal taxes).6 Sections 10 and
12 of the Administrative Procedure Act also provide generally for judicial
review of agency action so long as the statute does not preclude such
review and the agency action is by law committed to agency discretion.7
The district court, relying on these latter acts, held that it had jurisdiction
and that section 349 (a) (10) was unconstitutional. 8 The United States
Supreme Court partially affirmed the lower court, holding, with three
justices dissenting, that the district court could entertain this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The decision was confined to the ques-
tion of whether the district court had jurisdiction. The constitutionality
of the provision and other issues were not considered, but will be reargued
in the next term of the Court. Rusk v. Cort, 30 U.S.L. Week 4265 (U.S.
Apr. 3, 1962).
In speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Stewart placed great empha-
sis upon the legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 to support his interpretation of subsections 360 (a) and (b). The
predecessor of section 360 was section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940,°
which permitted a declaratory judgment to determine the right to citizen-
the United States at any port of entry, and shall be subject to all of the provisions
of this Act relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission
to the United States. A final determination by the Attorney General that any such
person is not entitled to admission to the United States shall be subject to review by
any court of competent jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and not other-
wise ... "
5. No remedy is provided if the Secretary affirms the denial.
6. 48 Stat. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958) : "In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. [Emphasis supplied.] Any declaration shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."
7. 60 Stat. 237, 243-244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958), § 1009: "Except so
far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion-
"(a) Right of Review - Any person suffering legal wrong because of any
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the
meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof."
§ 1011:
"No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions
of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly."
8. Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1961). Consequently the appellee
was still a citizen and thus the appellant was enjoined from denying the former a
passport on the ground that he was no longer a national.
9. 54 Stat. 1137, 1171-1172 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958).
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ship whether the person was in the United States or abroad. In addition,
the Act permitted the claimant to enter the country. Due to this latter
provision, certain problems arose; for example, an alien who alleged any
right would very often disappear into the general populace.10 Joint hear-
ings on a proposed bill to remedy the situation were held and the Depart-
ments of State and Justice submitted proposals. The former suggested that
declaratory relief be given to nonresidents whose original status as a
citizen was not in dispute.1' The latter recommended that such persons
should be required to obtain a certificate of identity and come to the country
to test their claims in accordance with normal immigration procedures.'
2
The Department of Justice's version was passed. The Senate Judiciary
Committee, in explaining the purposes of section 360, stated that
any person whose claim of citizenship has been denied and
who at one time was but is not now within the United
States, may be issued a certificate of identity for the purpose
of traveling to the United States to apply for admission. "The net effect
of this provision is to require that the determination of the nationality of
such person shall be made in accordance with normal immigration pro-
cedures. These procedures include review by habeas corpus proceedings
where the issue of the nationality status of the person can be properly
adjudicated."' 3 Thus, it would initially appear that section 360 was meant
to cover exactly the situation in the present case. Here, the claimant was
once within the physical bounds of the United States and is claiming his
right as a citizen.
However, as has been pointed out, sections 10 and 12 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act provide a right of review except where the statute pre-
cludes judicial review or expressly supersedes or modifies the Act. Al-
though there appears to be no judicial decision specifically dealing with
these sections in relation to section 360 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the courts' attitude toward the rights of aliens regarding claims of
citizenship should be considered. In Shaughncssv v. Pedreiro,14 there was
a deportation order against an alien under the Immigration Act of 195215
which provided that such orders shall be "final."' 6 The United States Su-
preme Court held that the word "final" did not preclude judicial review for
such a restrictive construction would run counter to sections 10 and 12 of the
10. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 777 (1950). Also see, Joint
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 716,
H.R. 2379 & 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 108-110, 443-445 (1951).
11. Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committees on the Judiciary
on S. 716, H.R. 2379 & 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 710 (1951).
12. Id. at 721.
13. S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 50 (1952). The Committee also
found that section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 had been used to gain entry
into the United States when no such right existed. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 777 (1950).
14. 349 U.S. 48, 75 S. Ct. 591 (1955).
15. 66 Stat. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1958) et seq.
16. Id. at § 1252(b) (4). "In any case in which an alien is ordered deported from
the United States, . . . the decision of the Attorney General shall be final."
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Administrative Procedure Act. "There is no language that expressly super-
sedes or modifies the expanded right of review granted by § 10. . ... '
A deportation order in McGrath v. Kristensen's brought under the Immi-
gration Act of 1917,19 which also provided that the administrative decision
shall be final, was held reviewable by the terms of the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act.20 The opinion did not discuss the applicability of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. "When an official's authority to act depends upon the
status of the person affected, in this case eligibility for citizenship, that
status, when in dispute, may be determined by a declaratory judgment
proceeding after the exhausting of administrative remedies." 2' The respond-
ent sought judicial review in Brownell v. We Shung22 of an agency's ad-
verse determination barring her admission to this country under the War
Brides Act.23 Notwithstanding the provision stating that when an alien
is excluded from admission, the decision shall be final unless reversed
on appeal to the Attorney General, the Court held that any preclusion of
judicial review would run counter to sections 10 and 12. "Exemptions
from the ... Act are not likely to be presumed. '24 In the present case, the
United States Supreme Court found that the intent of Congress in enacting
the Immigration and Nationality Act was not to cut off injunctive relief,
especially when viewed in context with the prior cases interpreting the
Act and the consequent effect upon the Administrative Procedure Act if a
different interpretation were adopted.
It would seem that the basic issue is whether subsections 360 (b)
and (c) were intended to include a person who was, prior to any agency
determination, a citizen of the United States. The majority states, "...
the question in this case is whether despite the liberal provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, Congress intended that a native of this
country living abroad must travel thousands of miles, be arrested, and
go to jail in order to attack an administrative finding that he is not a
citizen of the United States." 25 Such phrasing clouds the real issue.26
In order to reach its decision, the Court takes a journey through unusual
grammatical constructions of both the statute, in relation to the alleged
intent, and the Judiciary Committee's description of the purposes of the
statute. It concludes that since the word may is used throughout the sub-
sections, the remedy of habeas corpus is not an exclusive one and thus
17. 349 U.S. at 51, 75 S. Ct. at 594 (1955). See also Brzovich v. Holten, 222
F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1955); Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
aff'd, 346 U.S. 929, 74 S. Ct. 319 (1954). For a contrary analysis see Batista v.
Nicolls, 213 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1954).
18. 340 U.S. 162, 71 S. Ct. 224 (1950).
19. 39 Stat. 889 (1917), 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1958).
20. Supra note 6.
21. 340 U.S. at 169, 71 S. Ct. at 229 (1950).
22. 352 U.S. 180, 77 S. Ct. 252 (1956).
23. 59 Stat. 659, (Omitted from U.S.C. as expired three years after Dec. 28, 1945.)
24. 352 U.S. at 185, 77 S. Ct. at 255-256 (1956). See also Marcello v. Bonds,
349 U.S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 757 (1955).
25. Rusk v. Cort, 30 U.S.L. Week at 4267 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1962).
26. Compare the dissenting opinion at 4674-75.
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a person outside the country should not be denied "existing remedies." '2 7
It would appear equally plausible that Congress had intended that once
there was such a determination, the decision would be final and if one
wished to attack it, he might apply for a certificate and be confined to the
remedy of habeas corpus. This latter construction is strengthened by the
fact that section 360 (a), which concerns a person within the United
States who has been denied such rights, specifically permits an action
under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act. It is significant that
there are no such provisions in (b) and (c) of that section. Furthermore,
these latter subsections state that they are only applicable to persons who
have been physically present at some time in the United States, making
no distinction as to whether the person had previously been a citizen.
Be that as it may the Court then wanders into the legislative history of the
Act. The purpose of the statute as described by the Senate Judiciary
Committee is cited 28 as authority for the conclusion that the appellee was
not intended to be within the statute: ". . . it seems obvious that the
'such person' referred to in the Committee Report is a person who has
chosen to obtain a certificate . . . and seek admission to the United States
in order to prosecute his claim. The appellee in the present case is, of course,
not such a person.1 29 However, the preceding paragraph of the Com-
mittee's description begins with what appears to be a rather succinct state-
ment of its intent:
The bill modifies § 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940 by limiting
the court action exclusively to persons who are within the United
States .... 30
Thus the obvious would not seem to be so obvious. The cases cited
by the majority are easily distinguishable. In both Shaughnessy and
McGrath, the Court dealt with an alien in connection with a deportation
order; in We Shung, there was no question of citizenship. However, it
would appear that since the right of review was given, surely in a case
where citizenship is the crucial issue, this same right should not be de-
nied even if the only reason be policy. It is also quite clear that Cort
is not an example of the abuses that Congress sought to correct, for he
is not seeking admission to the country. Thus it seems that the opinion
can find refuge in three factors: (a) the policy of the immigration and
alien cases appear to support the decision; (b) the holding does not
frustrate the original purpose of the act; and (c) the act does not state
that it expressly supersedes or modifies the right of review. The latter
factor, however, followed to its conclusion, would demand that future
legislation concerning agency action must specifically state that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act does not apply. It is indeed questionable
27. Supra note 25. See also the district court's analysis, 187 F. Supp at 685.
28. Supra note 13.
29. Rusk v. Cort, supra note 25, at 4268.
30. Supra note 13.
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whether such a result would manifest the true intent of Congress. There-
fore, the Court, even though it delves into such unusual constructions and
relies on distinguishable cases, has protected an important right; namely,
the right to be heard in a court on the paramount question of citizenship.
There are two other major considerations which may underlie the
opinion. If the district court did not have jurisdiction, the appellee would
have been deprived of his citizenship without having gained access to a
court except through habeas corpus. Thus, the problem of a denial of
procedural due process would arise. If we conclude that due process has
been complied with, it would seem that the assumptions must be made
that both the constitutionality of the entire statute could be challenged in
habeas corpus and that the evidence could at least be reviewed. In fact,
the Judiciary Committee thought that the "status of the person can be
properly adjudicated" 31 in such a proceeding. In a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding in the federal courts, the constitutionality can be challenged under
a theory that an act which is unconstitutional is no law at all and thus a
person cannot be detained.32 However, such a proceeding does not usually
take evidence and probably will not even review the merits, but will just
determine whether the petitioner was afforded a fair hearing.33 Therefore,
there is deprivation without a judicial determination. Even if both as-
sumptions are correct, the due process question will come into play if
the application for the certificate is denied. The statute only gives an
appeal to the Secretary of State. Thus, if the latter sustains such a denial,
the person loses his citizenship without having had access to any court
for there is not even a provision for a habeas corpus hearing. The second
consideration is the determination of the constitutionality of the entire
section in that it deprives one of his citizenship merely because he evaded
the draft. Perhaps the only reason that the Court finds jurisdiction in
this case is to clear away the other above issues that could easily cloud
this one. A question of this magnitude should be decided by the Supreme
Court and not be avoided.3 4
The last difficulty one may encounter in the instant decision is found
in these words of the Court: ". . . we hold that a person outside the country
who has been denied a right of citizenship is not confined to the pro-
cedures prescribed by § 360 (b) and (c), and that the remedy pursued
in the present case was an appropriate one."135 Assuming that a person has
a constitutional right to be present in a proceeding of a federal court in
which he was a party, it would follow that once the action is filed, the
petitioner would then be allowed to come into this country and the problem
of disappearance into the general populace would be with us again. How-
31. See concurring opinion, 30 U.S.L. Week at 4269.
32. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880). See also 25 AM. JuR. Habeas Corpus
§29 (1940).
33. See generally, 25 AM. JUR. Habeas Corpus (1940).
34. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958) where the rationale
of cruel and unusual punishment declared another part of the statute unconstitutional.
35. Rusk v. Cort, supra note 25, at 4268.
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